BBV - E-voting is fatally flawed. Paper trails won't save it!

[Jim Sagle]

Even if the paper receipt reflects your vote, the electronic vote stored in the computer might not. The paper backup ballots would be available, but they wouldn't be used if the machines were rigged so that the electronic results weren't close enough to trigger a recount.

Discuss.

[ijk]

1. Okay.

There are a number of means to help prevent such a possibility. Without spending half the night answering, I'll sum it up like this:

a) We can make tampering with the machines quite difficult, particularly large-scale tampering. Computer security and intrusion detection is a real and serious art; it's just one that Diebold and its cousins have declined to bother learning. There's no reason to rely solely on computers when the paper ballot is perfectly feasible, but nevertheless a correctly designed system could be very close to invulnerable.

b) There are other parts to the system, outside the ballot box. In particular, we need a return to exit polling and a change in law allowing any candidate (or perhaps even citizens?) to demand a manual recount of any votes. A shift from the exit polling or last pre-election polling so large that the results were no longer close enough to automatically trigger a recount, should be large enough for a candidate to notice and call for a recount.

An additional virtue of such a system, if carefully designed, is that those who would seek to tamper with the vote would run an unavoidable risk of being caught, and punished suitably (boiling oil sounds about right); if anyone can call for a recount that would snare them, no amount of planning on their part offers safety. This is a major contrast to present systems, including all-paper ones - stuffing the ballot box may be difficult, but if you come up with a means to accomplish it, you can be almost certain you'll never be caught. That deterrent effect is very important, because no system can hope to be perfectly secure.

[wtmusic]

4. Wrong

"A correctly designed system could be very close to invulnerable"?

Then why does Bruce Schneier, internationally recognized as a leading authority in computer security, say computerized voting is and always will be a "horrendously dangerous idea"?

Intrusion is the least likely scenario by which voting data would be compromised. Far more likely would be an inside programming job where results are subtley manipulated in key precincts (or states) to produce the desired effect. The machine could literally rewrite its own code after results are submitted, making detection virtually impossible. These are basic techniques part of every hacker's toolbox.

Stuffing ballot boxes is not only far less detectable--it's also far less effective and nearly impossible to enact on a wide scale (unlike malicious source code).

Paper is best and always will be.

[ParanoidPat]

2. The 'Voter Confidence Acts' - H.R. 2239 & S. 1980.....

The 'Voter Confidence Acts' - H.R. 2239 & S. 1980 both call for a paper ballot or record of the voters intent and require a small percentage (.5%) of the paper ballots or records to be randomly audited in all Federal elections (and State elections if so legislated at the State level.) regardless of the closeness of the outcome as a check of machine integrity. If the hand counted totals do not match the machine reported totals, all of the paper records or ballots are counted.

H.R. 2239 contains the following language,

SEC. 7. REQUIREMENT FOR MANDATORY RECOUNTS.

The Election Assistance Commission shall conduct manual mandatory surprise recounts of the voter-verified records of each election for Federal office (and, at the option of the State or jurisdiction involved, of elections for State and local office) in .5 percent of the jurisdictions in each State and .5 percent of the overseas jurisdictions in which voter-verified records are preserved in accordance with this section immediately following each general election for Federal office, and shall promptly publish the results of those recounts. The treatment of the results of the recount shall be governed by applicable Federal, State, or local law, except that any individual who is a citizen of the jurisdiction involved may file an appeal with the Commission if the individual believes that such law does not provide a fair remedy.


S.B. 1980 contains the following language,

SEC. 7. REQUIREMENT FOR MANDATORY RECOUNTS.

The Election Assistance Commission shall conduct manual mandatory surprise recounts of the voter-verified records of each election for Federal office (and, at the option of the State or jurisdiction involved, of elections for State and local office) in .5 percent of the jurisdictions in each State and .5 percent of the overseas jurisdictions in which voter-verified records are preserved in accordance with this section immediately following each general election for Federal office, and shall promptly publish the results of those recounts. The treatment of the results of the recount shall be governed by applicable Federal, State, or local law, except that any individual who is a citizen of the jurisdiction involved may file an appeal with the Commission if the individual believes that such law does not provide a fair remedy.

[Jim Sagle]

3. Thanks, ParanoidPat. Looks like God is in the details.

:thumbsup:

[ParanoidPat]

5. It's that 'human readable' audit that makes all the difference.....

.....in my comfort level! :evilgrin:

If our elections officials are too stupid or lazy to count the votes I say move the f#%^ out of the way and let my friends and I do it! :)

Any volunteers? (How about YOU Mike? :hi: I trust you. )

[Andy_Stephenson]

6. I'll Help

count em.