According to U.S. Military Theory, We Can't Win in Iraq

[babylonsister]

http://www.alternet.org/waroniraq/48846/

According to U.S. Military Theory, We Can't Win in Iraq

By Kristian Williams, In These Times. Posted March 17, 2007.

Bush's new top commander in Iraq says he thinks the war in Iraq is winnable, but his recent manual on counterinsurgency suggests otherwise.

A soldier in Baghdad, in town for the "surge" and wondering whether things really are as bad as they seem, might want to read FM 3-24, the U.S. military's Counterinsurgency Field Manual, released last December. On Page 1-29, our soldier will find a handy table -- "Successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency operational practices" -- that outlines the Dos and the Don'ts.

In which column would one place the major decisions of the Bush administration? The dissolution of the Iraqi army, the de-Baathification of the civil service, the failure to guard important historic and cultural sites, the granting of reconstruction contracts to American firms, and the long-term neglect of legal due process -- all correspond to the advice on the "Don't" side of the chart. And that's not accounting for atrocities like those in Falluja, Haditha or Abu Ghraib. The "Dos" column, on the other hand, reads like a list of what the United States has failed to do: meeting the population's needs, expanding secure areas, politically isolating the insurgents, training and equipping Iraqi forces, securing the borders and so on.

If this table serves as a pocket-sized score card, the 280-page manual is a full-bodied treatise on the subject. This is the first new counterinsurgency field manual to appear in 20 years, and as such, it serves as a tacit admission that the American strategy in Iraq is simply not working. The manual's perspective takes on additional significance since its chief author, Gen. David Petraeus, has just taken over as the top commander in the war.

Petraeus, who wrote his dissertation at Princeton on the military lessons of the Vietnam War, distinguished himself in Mosul with his hearts-and-minds approach. Shortly after the 2003 invasion, he used the 101st Airborne to establish an overwhelming presence in the city, then promptly instituted foot patrols, held local elections and distributed money for reconstruction. At the year's end, Mosul was one of the few pacified areas. But Petraeus' approach ran counter to Rumsfeld's. At the beginning of 2004, Rumsfeld replaced the Airborne with a Stryker force one-fourth as large. The Stryker Brigade halted the foot patrols and the local government's efforts. Within a few weeks, Mosul was in chaos. The question facing Petraeus now is whether that process can be reversed -- three years later, on a much larger scale, and with a budding civil war. It's a tough test for the theory set out in his handbook.

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[mediaman007]

1. I would think that we should hope that he is successful.

His methods are the kinds of things that DUers suggested from the beginning of the war. I'll bet that the FReepers don't even know that they are supporting our approach to conflict. If Petraeus fails, the military could be in the hands of NeoCon bullies for the near future.

Petraeus seems to take an intellectual approach to problem solving. The Rumsfeld concept was "Shock and Awe!"

[zeemike]

2. We can win a military victory

But the people of the world will not have the stomach for it.
But to win we only need to kill them all. And we have the hardware to do that. Every time a shot is fired in Baghdad we just call in air strikes and wast the whole neighborhood.
That is how the Romans did it, if there was any resistance at all they would destroy the whole city. And in a sense we did that in WW2 with the carpet bombing of cities in Germany and Japan, and ultimately the abomination of desolation itself on two cities in Japan.
But those are the options the Generals will not talk about, because no one in there right mind would go along with that to a people that pose no threat to us at all.

[Solly Mack]

3. Petraeus patterns his thinking on Abrams, who took over for Westmoreland

in Vietnam.

Westmoreland was a purger - just hit and hit and hit - search and destroy - large body count...a real Bush like hearts and minds campaign..meaning it was anything but

Then came along Abrams who wanted to "clear and hold" - (Petraeus calls his "clear, hold , and build")

It's a replay of events.

Use of Petraeus's thinking is just a stop-gag measure for Bush Inc....a way to stave off the inevitable for as long as possible so Bush can pass his mess off on others and blame others for his fuck ups.

Petraeus does believe in his thinking , however (but that's another topic, albeit related) - but it's too late for it at this juncture - from a completely strategic point of view - and without inclusion of the whole truth. I happen to think Iraq was always a no-win situation and don't allow myself to be influenced by the "failures in Iraq were of a strategic nature" talking point..for it is a talking point meant solely to distract from how America got into Iraq and make the "war" a question of bad verses good strategy as opposed to criminal executive policy from the get go.


Now, the kicker is, they ALL (Bush, Cheney, even Rumsfeld...as well as Rice and especially Petraeus)
are following the thinking of Lewis Sorley who wrote a book called "A Better War", claiming IF ONLY America had "stayed the course" with the "clear and hold" method, America would have won big in Vietnam...

Sorley blames the "lack of will" from the American people for not staying the course..that support for the war was not "steadfast" and Sorley concludes this is the biggie for failure in Vietnam

Stop me when this starts sounding familiar...

Bush Inc are only reading the book to look for ways to place the blame, in my opinion. They are looking for spin...

They have a playbook of talking points in other words.

[madrchsod]

4. the only way to "win the war" was to

kill every living thing in bagdad,line the roads with dead bodies,and place saddam`s head at the gate of the city. go "old school" on the iraqi`s

[nebenaube]

5. I discussed Iraq with my "lifer" father during desert storm.

He said all we would have to do to defeat Saddam (regime change) was to ensure the populace had access to enough ammunition and bomb materials; we'd never have to actually go in on the ground. Apparently a well armed insurgency cannot be defeated. (Hint, Hint)