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(PINR)Nuclear Iran: Repercussions for Turkey and Saudi Arabia

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nosmokes Donating Member (1000+ posts) Send PM | Profile | Ignore Fri Jan-28-05 01:41 AM
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(PINR)Nuclear Iran: Repercussions for Turkey and Saudi Arabia
i don't agree with this dude, but this will be the *reasoned* argument put forth if sy hersh's sources are right and we do start some shit in iraq this summer. interesting read, anyhow. - joe
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_______________________________________
Power and Interest News Report (PINR)
http://www.pinr.com
content@pinr.com
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28 January 2005
Today's analyst, Jonathan Feiser, is a current U.S. Air Force intelligence analyst. For two past analyses on Iran, please see:

"Tehran Buys Itself More Time from U.S. Pressure"
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id...

"Iran's Bid for Regional Power: Assets and Liabilities"
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id...

Also, on Sunday Iraq will hold national elections. To read an important analysis on Iraq's election process, please see:

"Iraq's Perilous Election and the Need for Exit Strategies"
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id...


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Nuclear Iran: Repercussions for Turkey and Saudi Arabia
Drafted By: Jonathan Feiser
http://www.pinr.com

On January 1, 2005, Iran at last codified that the Islamic republic will be holding presidential elections this summer. One of the major policy issues that will be affected by this election will be Iran's potential development and acquisition of nuclear weapons. A nuclear Iran -- regardless of its intention -- remains a clear and intrinsic threat both to the United States and its regional interests and allies.
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Turkey's Reaction to a Nuclear Iran

Turkey's reaction to a nuclear-armed Iran is a complicated one at best. Turkey had spent its Cold War years under the nuclear umbrella afforded by the United States. For Ankara, N.A.T.O. has become more of a symptom of the past than a solution to the future, and Turkey's geopolitical and strategic situation vis--vis a nuclear Iran capitalizes on this new landscape.
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Saudi Arabia's Reaction to a Nuclear Iran

It would also be unlikely that Saudi Arabia would nuclearize in the face of a nuclear-armed Iran, certainly not because of economic factors, but rather because of potential political problems (although cost would nonetheless remain a very real deliberating factor). Like Turkey, there remain other factors that do, and would continue to, motivate Riyadh to revert to more stringent, internal security policies versus attempting to galvanize any tilt toward strategic or medium range nuclear technology.
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Reacting to an Aggressive and Nuclear-Armed Iran

Both the Saudi monarchy and the Turkish republic would face a precarious dilemma in the face of a nuclear Iran arm-twisting for conciliatory benefits. In such an event, Saudi Arabia would face the possibility of conceding limited regional influence to Iran -- a decision that would certainly heighten the chance of increased U.S. military aid to the Saudi regime in order to rebuff potential unpleasant developments that would tip the balance of power against U.S. regional interests.
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Conclusion

A nuclear Iran would alter the Middle Eastern balance of power as well as create a risk for policymakers and military leaders in the United States and Israel. Key regional states, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, have become more neutral over time in regards to Iran. Some balances, however, are all too often more temporal than permanent.
The likely result of U.S. allies Turkey and Saudi Arabia pursing a nuclear Iran with a "neutral course" remains an option defined by both internal domestic consensus and fear of being perceived "too close" to the United States or its "war on terrorism" for political and/or ideological reasons. Such a course, however, in the face of a nuclear Iran will cause the U.S. and its allies to consider a variety of responses ranging from sabotage to, in the worst case, some form of U.S.-acknowledged Israeli military response that could possibly lead to some degree of direct or indirect U.S. military intervention.
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complete report available at http://www.pinr.com

Report Drafted By:
Jonathan Feiser
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The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based publication that seeks to, as objectively as possible, provide insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of inquiries@pinr.com . All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com .

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