KEY FINANCIAL EFFECTS OVERLOOKED
FLAWED ECONOMIC METHODS, Part 1Economic analysis is just plain hard as heck. This is the first in a series of essays intended to expose why economic forecasts are so unbelievably poor or “quality challenged.” Today a personal touch will be shared from my experiences and contacts. This is not an exact science, but rather a social science, one which contains an element of art. The craft has sadly become more complex by financial market factors and subverted by political motives. The topic explored is key financial effects, which are commonly overlooked in economic analysis. The collective result is steady large misses in forecasts. The degree of forecast error at the national level is two orders of magnitude worse than anything seen personally in the corporate world. The task is difficult, but the job done is far worse than it should be, since corrupted by vested interests. All too often, forecasts are nothing more than lazy extensions through the rear view mirror into the future, straight-line forecasts to extend into future months with no treatment or expectation of change or turns or anything unusual. Try that when driving a car and you run off the road. Economists protect some of the worst statisticians on the planet, a claim I make personally with loud voice and stern conviction. They have tarnished the image of my craft.
This essay is an attempt to begin the process of getting specific with my criticism, from a statistical analyst perspective. Personal past email to me has inquired about my regular insults directed at economists, to which a response is offered. The language will be kept clear to the layman. No mention of R-squared levels, beta coefficients, multi-collinearity, normality violations, correlated error, factor loads, orthogonal experimental designs, imbalanced designs, cross-elasticity, biased estimates, or autoregressive oscillations. Sorry, I got carried away, but nothing like what we see in govt statistical evidence to strain reality and truth in reporting. Economists get away with murder, as they soften the disaster underway, encourage consumers to press onward, and urge foreigners to keep the credit supply flowing.
Promoting a constructive inflationary policy by an economist is equivalent to denying the existence of gravity by a physicist, utterly insane. Reality first gets twisted, then things get crushed from “unexpected” falls. Blame is laid elsewhere; the public remains unaware. The rich get richer; the poor get poorer. The bond market shows signs of losing faith in the Greenspan Fed, perhaps centered on the arrival of inflation at precisely the time he spoke repeatedly about its absence. Fed statements bear no connection to the reality of quality statistical forecasts.
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OVERLOOKED FINANCIAL EFFECTSMost economic forecast models include the usual suspects like interest rates, disposable income, business investment, tax rates, federal budgets, household spending, and much more. My personal professional complaint is that many economic models are chock full of incestuous factors. They all depend on each other to such an extent that analysts insist on having several simultaneous models being estimated, all inter-related, some causal, some effectual. The statistical consequences are unstable estimates and forecasts from “structural equations” of questionable value. Small changes in the underlying factors result in large changes in the forecasts, yielding doubt to the overall meaningfulness of results. In human reproduction, we see the same results with incest. No wonder.
Another complaint has to do with NOT incorporating enough “external” factors which, in our increasingly important financial sector environment, have turned out to be very important indeed, if not dominant. Each of the following is a topic by itself, so discussion will be brief.
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Minefield of bank derivatives threatens financial viabilityThe historical road is littered with the damage of derivative risks gone bad. Proctor & Gamble, Bank One, PNCBank, Orange County, and others lead the list. The effect of failed hedge strategies is enormous. What used to be the prudent offload of risk from currency risk or interest rate risk or metal price risk or grain price risk has unfortunately turned into a casino boardroom risk whose quantification is difficult. A hilarious event occurred in 2000. Ashanti Goldfields hired an accounting firm in order to determine their balance sheet risk from hedge book activity. Their forward sales hedge program had gone amok. In a letter to shareholders, Buffett tells of the difficulties of exiting the derivatives business that Berkshire Hathaway inherited in his 1998 purchase of General RE. After all this time, and diligent effort to remove what he calls “financial sewage” from the balance sheets, he has been frustrated by the stubborn effects of derivatives. In five years, he has exited two thirds of 23 thousand derivative tickets and reduced counter-parties by half. BW has booked pre-tax losses in the last two years of $270 million, even under a measured pace of liquidations. The pace was kept gradual because he did not trust the accounting, was unsure his portfolio could absorb the risk, and could not afford to ignore new opportunities. He has recently concluded that the explosion in derivatives contracts may have created serious systemic risks to our nation. Given the extraordinary bond speculation, rising rates threaten derivatives, of which bonds are the primary vehicle, a systemic risk exists which Buffet recognizes. Rising interest rates, along with Greenspan comments on bond speculation, have heightened attention on this frightening subject. Are unwound hedgebook risk factors in economic forecast models? Doubt it.
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