Thus one of the problems with the US war on Vietnam was the refusal of the US to invade Laos and occupy both sides of the Mekong River. This was the main supply line for the Viet Cong. The US tried to use Air Power and long range Artillery but given the nature of the terrain both were inadequate to the mission. What was needed was troops on the ground BLOCKING any transport of supplies on and along the Mekong. The US dared NOT invade Laos for fear of Red Chinese Intervention (Which was threaten in the early years of the Intervention) and then when the relationship between Red China and the Former Soviet Union broke down in the late 1960s, the US dared not go in, for it meant the Red Chinese would have to move Troops from Manchuria (Where it faced the Soviet Far East Army) to Southern China (Such a move was NOT in the best interest of the US by 1969, the division between Red China and the Former Soviet Union strengthen the US hand when it came to BOTH countries, and any weakening of Red China was NOT in the best interest of the US, so intervention into Laos after 1969 was also out).
Now the Air Attacks continued, but given the inability of the Chinese to really do anything about an air assault NOT a factor in US Chinese relations under Nixon. At the same time NO US troops were going to go into Laos or North Vietnam for such a Move would have forced the Red Chinese to intervene (Which by 1969 we clearly did not want, we wanted those Chinese troops in Manchuria to stop any Soviet Invasion NOT in North Vietnam).
My point is the key to defeating any insurgency is to cut off the supplies. We did so in Korea but the blockade on the coast that prevented sea based supply routes and that our troops were between North Korean forces (and later Red Chinese forces) AND any insurgents in South Korea. In Vietnam, one of the first thing we did was used the Fleet to block supplies to the Viet Cong by sea. That lest the Mekong River. The Mekong flows south from China, through Laos, through Cambodia and at Phnom Penh turns east to flow past Saigon and into the South China Sea. Once supplies were past the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) along the Mekong River, the Viet Cong could move supplies from the Mekong to almost the whole of Northern South Vietnam (Where most of the areas controlled by the Viet Cong was located) The supplies terminated in the Mekong Delta (Another Major area of Viet Cong Control in South Vietnam). Notice the supplies went on or along the Mekong River (This is the famous "Ho Chin Mind Trail") and then into South Vietnam along various roads and paths that permitted constant supply of the Viet Cong troops (Through at a high cost, something like 10 pounds of supplies were used to get one pound to the Viet Cong Troops, Given the length was over twice as long as what the "Red Ball Express" did in WWII for the US Army, and the "Red Ball Express" did NOT have to worry about the other side having overwhelming air superiority this is a good figure for the Red Ball Express used something like 4 pound of supplies to get one pound to the troops AND that did NOT include the cost of shipping the supplies from the US to England and then to the Beaches of Normandy, that was just the cost in supplies from the Beaches to the troops). Please note the Red Ball Express only operated for three months, at which point the supply lines were so extensive, the supply line was using ALL the supplies to get almost nothing to the troops. The Ho Chin Minh Trail was in operation for over ten years and was the key to the Viet Cong insurgency. Without Supplies the Viet Cong would have had to stop fighting, no ammo, no ability to fight. With supplies the Viet Cong could, and did, fight both the US and South Vietnamese Forces for over ten years (In the the final year of the war provided vital local information for the North Vietnamese armor Assault that ended the war).
Thus supplies are the key to any Guerrilla/Partisan/insurgency even fought. If you can cut supplies, the Guerrilla/Partisan/insurgency will die, if you do not it will last until either it wins OR some sort of agreement is made between the Guerrilla/Partisan/insurgency and the people they are fighting (Such as what happen in Nepal a few years ago, and when the various Guerrilla/Partisan/insurgency ended in Central America during the 1980s i.e. Guatemala's end of its Civil War, the end of the War in El Salvador and even the end of the Contra's fight in Nicaragua. A deal was made and both sides decided it was better to stay with the deal then to go on fighting. Efforts to end such Guerrilla/Partisan/insurgency by cutting off supplies failed in all three cases so the Guerrilla/Partisan/insurgency could continue fighting until such time as the Government in each country made a deal with the Guerrilla/Partisan/insurgency that both sides could live with.
The opposite has happened in Columbia, FARC can still get supplies and thus fight even as the Central Government increases full scale Military assault. Thus the present attacks are on minor concern for none of them addresses the issue of supplies. The same with Afghanistan, the recent assault may strengthen the hand of the Central Government in relations to the Taliban but as long as the Taliban can supply its soldiers it can continue to fight. The US has tried to cut off supplies, but Pakistan is NOT co-operating when it comes to that fight (Pakistan is going through the Motions of co-operating but in reality NOT). The War in Pakistan is supplied by Pakistan (and how those supplies get to the Taliban is unclear, and if it is unclear to the US and Pakistan, the Taliban has a very good chance of winning the war in Pakistan and Afghanistan).
More on the Ho Chin Minh Trail:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ho_Chi_Minh_trailhttp://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1875.htmlThe Red Ball Express of WWII:
http://www.transchool.eustis.army.mil/MUSEUM/RebBallIntro.htmhttp://www.skylighters.org/redball/
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