It was clear from the information in the DOJ IG report, that the CIA had hidden the information on the al Qaeda planning meeting that took place in Kuala Lumpur from January 5-8, 2000 from the FBI criminal investigators on the Cole bombing numerous times in a wide ranging criminal conspiracy.
Tom Wilshire, the deputy chief of the Bin laden unit at the CIA, and who was in the middle of this criminal conspiracy, first initiated this conspiracy by blocking FBI Agent Doug Miller’s CIR on Khalid al-Mihdhar, on January 5, 2000. This CIR described Mihdhar's travel with Hazmi to an important al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur on January 5-8, 2000.
This CIR not only had Mihdhar’s passport photo and passport number, but also the fact that Mihdhar had a US multi-entry visa that said his destination was the Marriott in New York, quite likely the very Marriot that was destroyed when the WTC Towers came down. When asked after the attacks on 9/11 by the DOJ IG criminal investigators why this cable had been blocked, Wilshire said he could not recollect this cable or why it had been blocked. Michele, his CIA desk officer told the DOJ IG investigators that she had no recollection of this cable or the cable she sent out right after she had blocked Miller’s cable on Mihdhar that said this information on Mihdhar had been sent to the FBI, when it had not been sent.
She could not even recall who asked her to write on the bottom of this cable, “Blocked by order of the Deputy Chief”, at the time Tom Wilshire, or who had asked her to send out another cable that said the information on Mihdhar had been sent to the FBI. Even Doug Miller said he could not recall this cable, but Miller later told author James Bamford that he had been ordered by the FBI to deliberately withhold any information on his cable on Mihdhar from the DOJ IG investigators. But withholding information from a DOJ criminal investigation is a crime, and asking someone to withhold information is a conspiracy to commit a crime. So it is clear that the FBI committed a crime by asking Miller not to answer the DOJ IG questions on this cable.
The DOJ IG report documented the fact that Tom Wilshire was moved from his high level manger position at the CIA to the FBI in mid-May 2001 to be liaison to Michael Rolince, the head of the ITOS unit. Wilshire had been moved over to the FBI by Cofer Black and George Tenet, just after the CIA received an official request from FBI Special Agent Ali Soufan, in April 2001. This was a request for any information the CIA had on Walid Bin Attash, thought to be one of the masterminds of the Cole bombing, and for any information on an al Qaeda planning meeting in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000. The CIA never responded directly to Soufan's official request.
But it now appears that the CIA literally went ballistic when it received this request from Soufan. The CIA clearly thought that the FBI Cole criminal investigators had uncovered the information on the Kula Lumpur al Qaeda planning meeting, and the fact that Mihdhar and Hazmi had been at this meeting planning the Cole bombing with Walid Bin Attash, the very information the CIA had been keeping as one of their most closely guarded secrets from the FBI criminal investigators.
We know the CIA wanted to find out what the FBI criminal investigators had found out about Kuala Lumpur, because the first thing Wilshire did just after his move to the FBI ITOS unit was to enlist FBI IOS Agent Dina Corsi to set up a meeting for June 11, 2001 with the very people who worked for Soufan, the FBI Cole bombing investigators in New York City field office under Soufan’s assistant, FBI Special Agent Steve Bongardt.
While Wilshire claimed he had no official role at the FBI ITOS unit, and Corsi actually worked for FBI Supervising Special Agent Rod Middleton, it is still a mystery how or why Corsi ended up clearly working for Wilshire as he carried out his criminal conspiracy at the FBI to withhold critical information from FBI criminal investigations.
At this meeting in the New York City field office of the FBI, Bongardt and some of his investigators were shown three photos, by Dina Corsi, of Mihdhar taken at Kuala Lumpur, photos obtained from the CIA by Tom Wilshire. One photo even included Hazmi together with Mihdhar at Kuala Lumpur.
After Corsi presented these Kuala Lumpur photos, CIA officer Clark Shannon, who was working at the CIA Bin Laden unit, Wilshire’s former group, asked Bongardt and his team if they could recognize anyone in these photographs. Bongardt and the other Cole investigators said they were unable to recognize anyone in these photos but then quickly became suspicious of why the CIA and FBI HQ were showing them these photographs.
Bongardt asked Shannon and Corsi; “Who are these people and what do they have to do with the Cole bombing?” Neither Corsi nor Shannon would give him any answers other to say “the wall” did not allow this information to be given to him or his investigators. But it turns out one the FBI investigators in the room was actually an FBI intelligence investigator, for whom there was no restriction at all on receiving intelligence information. If the wall were really a restriction, Corsi and Shannon could have asked the FBI criminal investigators to step outside the meeting for a few minutes while they gave all of the information they had to this intelligence agent.
But both Shannon and Corsi, and even Wilshire who was not at this meeting he had set up, all knew that the people in these photographs, Mihdhar and Hazmi had been at the Kuala Lumpur al Qaeda planning meeting with Walid Bin Attash, actually planning the Cole bombing. Yet they all withheld this information from Bongardt and his team, the very FBI agents who were assigned to investigate this horrific crime, the attack on the USS Cole that killed 17 US sailors.
Both Wilshire and Shannon even knew that Nawaf al-Hazmi, known to be a very dangerous long time al Qaeda terrorist, had already entered the US. Both had just reviewed the cable that the CIA had received in March 5, 2000 that stated that Hazmi had flown into the US from Bangkok on January 15, 2000. There is no explanation when both Wilshire and Shannon knew that Hazmi had not only taken part in the bombing of US embassies in east Africa that had killed over 200 people and had also help plan the bombing of the USS Cole why they did not give this information on Mihdhar and Hazmi to Bongardt and his team of FBI criminal investigators. This has never been explained even 7 ½ years after the attacks on 9/11.
Intelligence information was supposed to pass immediately to FBI criminal investigators when any evidence of a criminal act had been uncovered. Instead the CIA and FBI HQ agents continued to withhold this information from the FBI criminal investigation, knowing full well that they were in fact committing a felony that would send them to prison for years if uncovered. Since this meeting had actually been set up by CIA officer Tom Wilshire, it is clear Wilshire and the CIA had forbidden both Shannon and Corsi from giving any of this information to the FBI Cole investigators.
It is now also clear that both Louis Freeh and Michael Rolince had to know when Wilshire was moved over to the FBI in mid-May, 2001 by Cofer Back and George Tenet, that Wilshire in fact was a CIA spy being planted into the FBI single most important organization that controlled all FBI criminal investigations in the world.
Rolince also had to know when Wilshire set up the meeting with the FBI Cole investigators on June 11, 2001, right after being moved to the FBI, that he was doing this to make sure that the information the CIA had from the Kuala Lumpur meeting had never been discovered by the Cole bombing investigators. In fact, it is impossible to believe that FBI IOS Agent Corsi, who actually worked for Rod Middleton, had not been ordered by Rolince to work for Wilshire, as he carried out his criminal obstruction of the Cole bombing investigation.
We also know from the DOJ IG report that even FBI IOS HQ Agent Dina Corsi was aware well before this June 11, 2001 meeting with the FBI Cole bombing investigators that Khallad Bin Attash had been at the Kuala Lumpur meeting planning the Cole bombing with Mihdhar and Hazmi.
On July 5 2001, Wilshire sent email back to his CTC managers. Wilshire indicated that he felt that the people who were at the Kuala Lumpur al Qaeda planning meeting were connected to the massive warnings of a huge al Qaeda attack that the CIA had been receiving since April 2001. SEE DOJ IG report, July 5, 2001.
In July 13, 2001 email back to his CTC mangers; he requested permission to transfer the information he had on the Kuala Lumpur meeting to the FBI. See “Substitution for the testimony of John”, aka Tom Wilshire, entered into the Moussaoui trial on March 11, 2006,
http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/notablecases /... /
In his July 23, 2001, email Wilshire clearly stated that Khalid al-Mihdhar and by association Nawaf al-Hazmi were going to take part on the next big al Qaeda operation. He also asked why no one had responded to his July 13, 2001 request to transfer the Kuala Lumpur information to the FBI Cole bombing investigators. See “Substitution for the testimony of John”.
In July 2001 when the CIA was clearly aware that a huge al Qaeda attack was about to take place inside of the US, they clearly had forbidden Tom Wilshire twice from turning over the information on the Kuala Lumpur al Qaeda planning meeting to the FBI criminal investigators on the Cole bombing, they very information that would have prevented that attacks on 9/11.
Wilshire was forbidden from turning over this information at the almost the exact same time that Tenet and Black held an extremely urgent meeting in the White House with Rice and Clarke on July 10, 2001 indicating that a huge al Qaeda attacks was about to take place inside of the US that would kill thousands of Americans. One week later Tenet and Black gave this same information to both John Ashcroft, head of the DOJ and the FBI and Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense.
On August 22, 2001, less than one month after Wilshire sent his email to his CTC managers indicating Mihdhar would take part in the next big al Qaeda attack, both Wilshire and Dina Corsi were told US by FBI IOS Agent Margaret Gillespie, a FBI agent at the CIA Bin Laden unit, that Mihdhar and Hazmi were found to be inside of the US. See “Substitution for the testimony of John”, August 22, 2001.
It is clear that both Wilshire and Corsi knew immediately that Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US in order to take part in this massive al Qaeda attack that would kill thousands of Americans.
In spite of this, they forced the investigation of Mihdhar away from Bongardt by urgently requesting the head of the FBI intelligence unit in New York, Craig Donnachie, to start an intelligence investigation of Mihdhar. When they did this, they knew that the CIA had been hiding from the FBI criminal investigators, the photograph of Bin Attash taken at Kuala Lumpur. This was the very photograph that clearly connected both Mihdhar and Hazmi to the actual planning of the Cole bombing. By doing this Bongardt had no real clear evidence that would connect Mihdhar and Hazmi to the planning of the Cole bombing, evidence that would have allowed him to start a criminal investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi.
But FBI Agent Steve Bongardt found out about that both Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US when FBI supervisor at the New York office, John Liguori, accidentally send Corsi's EC to him on August 28, 2001. When Bongardt called Corsi and demanded that the investigation and search for Mihdhar be given to him and his team, Corsi told him that since the information on Mihdhar and Hazmi had come from the NSA and the NSA had caveats on this information that required written permission from them before it could be sent to FBI criminal investigators, he was forbidden to have any part in any investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi.
But from Defense Exhibit #681, found on the Moussaoui court web site, in email on August 29, 2001, from Dina Corsi to John Liguori (the FBI manager at the New York FBI field office), Dina Corsi says:
"John (Liguori),
” I think I may have caused some unnecessary confusion with this issue. The EC on al-Mihdhar I sent to Craig (Donnachie), via email marking it as a DRAFT so that he could read it before he went on vacation. There is material in the EC which has not been approved and which is not cleared for criminal investigators (meaning the FBI Cole bombing investigators on the Cole bombing). Steve and Rod, (this is Rod Middleton, her boss) and I spoke with him, (FBI Agent Steve Bongardt) and tried to explain why this case had to stay on the intel side of the house.”
But Defense Evidence #448, on the same web site, is the actual NSA release that Dina Corsi received from the NSA, and shows that this release had already been approved on August 27, 2001, and sent to Corsi on August 28, 2001. This release had actually been approved by the NSA in just a few hours after being submitted on August 27, 2001!
This release clearly stated that the NSA information on the Kuala Lumpur meeting and the names Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, who were attending this important al Qaeda planning meeting, was cleared by the NSA to be sent to the “FBI criminal investigators on the Cole bombing in New York”, FBI Steve Bongardt and his team. When Corsi tells Bongardt that this information had not yet been approved and is not cleared for criminal investigators, it is clear she is lying to him in a desperate attempt to shut down his investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi.
After being told he could not take part in the investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi, Bongardt asked Corsi to get a ruling from the NSLU, to see if he could take part in the investigation of Mihdhar, since he knew Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US in order to take part in a horrific al Qaeda attack that would kill many Americans. Bongardt could not see any connection to any FISA warrant when the NSA had obtained this information and felt that the NSA and NSLU would readily approve this information going to him and his team.
But Corsi told him on August 29, 2001 that she had consulted NSLU attorneys, and that they had ruled he could not be part of any investigation and search for Mihdhar.
From evidence item #682 also on the same site.
Email from Dina Corsi to Steve Bongardt 8/29 7:44 AM
Steve,
Rod and I spoke with National Security Law Unit (NSLU) in order to confirm that our recommendations were accurate. And get answers to the questions you posed. They responded as follows:
Al-Mihdhar should be opened as a FFI. If Mihdhar is located the interview must be conducted by an intel agent criminal agent CAN NOT be present at the interview. The case is entirely based on intel. If at such time information is developed indicating the existence of a substantial Federal crime, that information will be passed over the wall according to procedures.
Email, Steve back to Corsi, 08/29 8:38 AM
Dina- where is "the wall" defined? Isn't it dealing with FISA information"? I think everyone is still confusing this issue. I know we discussed this issue ad nasuseum but "the wall" concept grew out of the fear that FISA would be obtained as opposed to a Title III. Whatever has happened to this - someday someone will die - the public will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain "problems". Let’s hope the National security unit will stand behind their decisions...
Email, Corsi back to Steve, Aug 29, 2001 9:27 AM
Steve, I do know how you feel about this. I don't think you understand that we at FBIHQ are all frustrated with this issue. I don’t know what to tell you. I don't know how many other ways I can explain this to you. These are the rules. NSLU does not make them up and neither does UBLU.
This was almost exactly 2 weeks before the attacks on 9/11 and still plenty of time that Bongardt could have had to stop the attacks that took place on 9/11, had he been allowed to continue his investigation of Mihdhar..
It is now clear that FBI Agent Bongardt was right. From page 538, footnote 81 in the 9/11 Commission’s own report we learn that Corsi had fabricated Attorney Sherry Sabol’s ruling. According to testimony she gave to DOJ IG investigators on November 7, 2002, Attorney Sabol stated that she had in fact, ruled that Bongardt could be part of any investigation of Mihdhar since the NSA information was not connected to any FISA warrant.
Sabol even told Corsi, if Corsi was still confused about this issue she could go herself to the NSA herself and get a release from the NSA caveats. So it is clear that Corsi withheld the fact from Attorney Sabol that she had already obtained a release from the NSA on August 27, 2001, two days earlier!
But Corsi also knew full well that Mihdhar and Hazmi had taken part in the planning of the Cole bombing attacks and had even taken part in the east Africa bombings. So there was already plenty of evidence “ indicating the existence of a substantial Federal crime”. So it is clear that there was absolutely no valid reason for Corsi, who had been closely working with Wilshire, to shut down FBI Agent Bongardt’s investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi.
It is clear that Wilshire had been ordered by his CTC managers at the CIA to keep all of the information from Kuala Lumpur from ever going to the FBI criminal investigators on the Cole bombing.
But, since both Corsi and Wilshire had criminally obstructed his investigation of the Cole bombing numerous times, and they both knew if Bongardt continued with any investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi, and then obtained the photographs of Mihdhar and Hazmi along with the photograph of Bin Attash taken at Kuala Lumpur planning the Cole bombing, he would have immediately known that the June 11, 2001 meeting set up in New York City had been a CIA sting on the FBI and his team, and that the CIA had been hiding this information all along.
It is now also clear that this huge criminal conspiracy first to withhold information on the Kuala Lumpur meeting from the FBI Cole investigators and then to finally shut down Bongardt’s criminal investigation of Mihdhar went way beyond either Corsi and Wilshire.
The following lists the many additional reasons this criminal conspiracy must have gone way beyond either Corsi or Wilshire.
First it is clear that Tenet and Black had forbidden Wilshire twice from giving the very information on the Kuala Lumpur meeting attended by Mihdhar and Hazmi, and Bin Attash to the FBI criminal investigators, when at the almost the exact same time they were having an urgent meeting in the White House with Rice and Clark, on July 10, 2001, describing a huge al Qaeda attack just about to take place inside of the US that would kill thousands of Americans.
Second, Tenet's testimony to the 9/11 Commission on April 14, 2004 indicated he was clearly hiding his meetings in August 2001 with the President of the United States from the American public.
At this hearing, 9/11 Commissioner Tim Roemer asked the question: "If you, (George Tenet), knew that the al Qaeda terrorists were about to mount a huge attack inside of the US that would kill thousands of Americans why did he not tell the President in August?"
Tenet answered that he was in Washington DC and the President was in Crawford Texas, and that is “why he had not told the President”.
Then Roemer asked why did he not pick up the telephone and call the President and give him this horrific information.
Tenet in answer said he had not called the President in August but just could not go beyond this as an explanation. He simply could offer no possible explanation at all of why he had not called the President of the United States and given him this horrific information, and main stream media seemed unusually uncurious about this.
But Bill Harlow, the CIA spokesman came out after Tenet’s testimony and said Tenet had misspoken, which is CIA speak for lied. Harlow said that Tenet had flown down to Crawford on August 17, and had seen the President in Washington on August 31, and six more times in September before the attacks on 9/11. So it is clear that he had plenty of opportunity to tell the President of the United States about this huge al Qaeda attack.
We now know he had also flown down to Crawford on August 24, 2001 in order to have a meeting with the President on August 25, 2001. This is just after Tenet learned on August 23, that Moussaoui had been arrested after the FBI thought he was a terrorist learning to fly a 747. Tenet had also learned on August 23, that Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US preparing to take part in a massive al Qaeda attack that he knew would kill thousands of Americans, when FBI Agent Gillespie had the CIA Bin Laden unit issue a worldwide alert for Mihdhar and Hazmi.
So just what did George Tenet Director of the CIA, who had all of this horrific information tell the President of the United States of America at these meetings. It seems that after 7 1/2 year that we still do not know. But we know he was willing to lie to the American people and to the 9/11 Commission, a major crime of perjury, in order to hide these meetings with the President.
But isn’t this what psychologists call "consciousness of guilt", something one does only if they have committed a crime!
We now know this because we know from the DOJ IG report that on August 23, 2001 Margaret Gillespie had issued a worldwide alert for Mihdhar and Hazmi, an alert that clearly went to the head of the CIA Bin Laden unit, to Cofer Black, and to George Tenet, and to at least 50-60 other people at the CIA according to the CIA IG report.
All of these people not only knew Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US, but almost all of these people were aware that the CIA had received numerous warnings of a massive al Qaeda attack that would kill thousands. Many including chief of the Bin Laden unit Richard B., Cofer Black and George Tenet knew of Wilshire’s emails that clearly identified Mihdhar and Hazmi as al Qaeda terrorists who were going to take part in this attack.
Yet not only did they all keep silent about this huge threat to the people in the US, and did not warn anyone at either the FBI criminal units or the US government, but many must also have known that thousands of Americans were about to perish in these huge al Qaeda attacks that the CIA and FBI HQ had been warned about since April 2001.
The 9/11 Commission stated as one of their most important conclusions that:
"We could not understand why the CIA had never connected Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi to the warnings of a massive al Qaeda attack the CIA and FBI HQ were both aware of".
But the email from Wilshire on July 5, 2001 and July 23, 2001, that had connected Mihdhar and Hazmi to the warnings of a huge al Qaeda attack, and which were sent to the management of the CIA would have rendered this conclusion somewhat less than accurate. The testimony of Corsi shows that FBI HQ intentionally shut down the investigation of Bongardt even when they knew this would block the only FBI criminal investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi that could have prevented the upcoming al Qaeda attacks that took place on 9/11.
Had this information been brought out at the 9/11 Commission hearings, it would have caused a major problem for the CIA and FBI HQ when the American people found out that our own intelligence agencies had deliberately and intentionally allowed the attacks on 9/11 to take place.
The conclusion that the 9/11 Commission reached that the CIA and FBI were not criminally involved in allowing the attacks on 9/11 was a conclusion the 9/11 Commission had been required to make since their job was to insure that no one was blamed for intentionally allowing the attacks on 9/11 to take place.
It is now clear that they in fact intentionally left out critical information that showed the many criminal actions at both the CIA and FBI HQ to deliberately and criminally obstruct the FBI investigation of the Cole bombing. So that no one could be blamed for 9/11, it was considered important that the 9/11 Commission withhold this evidence until long after the 9/11 Commission had reached their final conclusions and wrote their final report.
Since the 9/11 Commission had subpoena power and had access to all of this information that now make up the “Substitution of John” and all of the other interviews, emails and other evidence items that are now part of the DOJ IG report and the record of the Moussaoui trial, it is clear that the 9/11 Commission report reached conclusions that were contrary to the very evidence they were already aware of. One might says this renders the entire effort of the 9/11 Commission a complete fraud. See www.eventson911.com, for the actual US government documents.