Iraqification—A Losing Strategy by Fareed Zakaria
If the U.S. footprint is reduced, guerrillas will not stop fighting. They will probably step up their attacks on the Iraqi Army and politicians
snip....
When we speak of sending “Iraqis” on raids into the Sunni Triangle, who would these soldiers be? Sunnis? They might not want to hunt down Baathists, or might easily be bought off. Shiites and Kurds? That would galvanize the Sunni populations in support of the guerrillas. If the goal is to stabilize Iraq, fomenting intragroup violence might not be the best path.
If the American footprint is reduced, it will not make the guerrillas stop fighting. (“Hey, Saddam, we’ve scared the Americans back into their compounds. Let’s ease up now and give them a break.”) On the contrary, the rebels will step up their attacks on the Iraqi Army and local politicians, whom they already accuse of being collaborators. Iraqification could easily produce more chaos, not less.
The idea of a quick transfer of political power is even more dangerous. The Iraqi state has gone from decades of Stalinism to total collapse. And there is no popular national political party or movement to hand power to. A quick transfer of authority to a weak central government will only encourage the Shiites, the Sunnis and the Kurds to retain de facto autonomy in their regions and fragment the country.
For the neoconservatives in the Pentagon, a quick transfer fulfills a pet obsession, installing into power the Iraqi exiles led by Ahmad Chalabi. Last week The Philadelphia Inquirer quoted a senior administration official as saying, “There are some civilians at the Pentagon who’ve decided that we should turn this over to someone else and get out as fast as possible.” But every indication we have is that the exiles do not have broad popular support.
There are no shortcuts out. Iraq is America’s problem. It could have been otherwise, but in the weeks after the war the administration, drunk with victory, refused to share power with the world. Now there can be only one goal—success. The first task of winning the peace in Iraq is winning the war—which is still being waged in the Sunni heartland. And winning it might take more troops, or different kinds of troops (send back the Marines). It might take a mixture of military force and bribes—to win over some Sunni leaders. But whatever it takes, the United States must do it. Talk about a drawdown of troops sends exactly the wrong message to the guerrillas. In the words of one North Vietnamese general, “We knew that if we waited, one day the Americans would have to go home.”
more...
http://msnbc.com/news/988000.asp?0cb=-313190131