Reply #46: No, but you're taking their thoughts out of context.

[Occam Bandage]

Both Nimitz and MacArthur thought a continued blockade and bombing campaign, culminating in an invasion, were necessary to end the war. They thought the atomic bombs were flashy but useless toys. Both saw the 1946 report as a vindication of their beliefs (which it was), but yet neither believed the end of the war was merely two weeks off at the time the bomb was dropped. If the war had continued a month, more Japanese would have died of bombing, disease, and starvation than died at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.

The Japanese were unable to sustain a naval or air war effort, yes. But they still refused to surrender, and the war continued in China. They did not even surrender after the first bomb was dropped. They would not have surrendered after the second bomb if not for Hirohito's unprecedented intervention. They could not fight us, but they believed they could not be destroyed either, and they were planning on enduring the bombs as the British endured Hitler's, until like Hitler we realized that bombing alone would not work, and we had to face the dismal prospect of a multi-million casualty invasion. They were mistaken in their beliefs; they would indeed have collapsed shortly. But neither Truman nor any of his advisors believed in August 1945 that the Japanese were close to collapse.

You keep saying our military leaders at the time told Truman the bomb wasn't necessary. Where are the memos in which they say that? It's all public record by now. The only memos arguing against the bombs are saying the bomb wouldn't be enough, rather than saying the bomb would be too much.