Reply #8: That's a point where I think his GON clouds his judgement

[NV1962]

"Get Out Now" (GON for short) is alluring to the hands-offish toward foreign policy of course, and if you mix in the suggestive statement that troops staying there won't "prevent more tragic Iraqi deaths", it might be enough to root for a fast pull-out.

Thing is this, though: the killing won't stop either way. Whether troops stay or leave, there'll be killings. A naked and stubborn fact, that.

So, the question rephrased more properly, or the crux of the matter here, is this: can the extent and duration of the killings be lessened?

I think it can. General Odom suggests it can't. There's our difference.

Now, General Odom is very right that the US can't go alone in "fixing" Iraq, more or less mirroring the prosecution of the invasion and occupation itself. He's suspiciously silent, however, on the necessity of involving other countries (say, Russia, France, Germany and a nominal EU representative together with regional players like for example Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey) in order to make a multilateral accord actually stick.

But if you pull together diplomatic resources, by another (trustworthy!) team in the White House, with a more realistic and outcome-oriented plan toward an eventual disengagement in mind, which respects and actively seeks involvement of international partners -- and neither photo-ops or token "allies", although we really never should forget Poland, haha -- you get an awful lot more close to that goal I mentioned, of limiting the extent and duration of the carnage there.

Elsewhere I've sketched why a multilateral accord is not only necessary but strategically inevitable (given that the current ongoing escalation of the crisis is intolerable to forces I've mentioned, like also China) if that more fine-tuned definition of "success" is to be realized.

But more important than anything else, I think that, no matter how much on point General Odom is in his commentary on the other myths, he set himself up for failure to bolster a GON case with his "Myth #2", which doesn't admit the possibility of setting different goals - like "simple" regime change. There are several possible scenarios for that; all are worthless at this point, given the utter state of devastation in Iraq. The "new" goal therefore is, in its minimalist expression, one of "damage control" but, with a pinch of ambition and humility (i.e. and among others, an admission of failure by the next administration) "creating a stabilized region in the Middle East, that is hostile to al Q'aida" (speaking of utter failure by the Bush administration!) is quite possible. General Odom is wrong when he limits his assertive answer to Myth #3 (in that the US can't "fix" it alone) to a simple negation, instead of pointing to the logical alternative of teamwork. With reliable allies, and not necessarily all "loyal" ones - which is the particular Bush fetish that created this mess.

Washing your hands from ongoing carnage without the gumption or stomach to intervene and cap the bleeding is what John Major did in the UK (aided by the GOP in Congress) with regard to Rwanda. It's a damn good thing the Clinton Administration pushed ahead with Bosnia (perhaps in shameful recognition of the magnitude of the disaster in Rwanda); had it been up to the ineffective Europeans, there'd perhaps still be a genocidal conflict going on in the Balkans.

Staying away from massive bloodshed is never wise counsel; sooner or later, the massive bloodshed will extend to your doorstep.

Sadly, plenty of historic proof of that abounds.

I acknowledge and agree with a fundamental tenet behind General Odom's reluctance toward an ongoing military engagement, but I firmly believe that GON is a goner that no person with a conscience can live with in the longer term.