Reply #17: Any system that allows vote switching is NOT the best solution we have.

[Bill Bored]

But op scan may end up being the best solution we'll have left.

NC's audits are very limited. Only one contest; escalation in the event of discrepancies is done in the NEXT election! Come on Kelvin, you can do better than that!

Why not create (or maintain an existing) system that doesn't allow the damn vote switching in the first place? Instead we have to spend our time trying to convince legislators and election officials to prove that the vote switching is not happening. That's not how I plan to spend my golden years!

The bottom line is, we'll trust the software and we're expected to LIKE it too (by showing up to vote).

Meanwhile, the operation of GEMS I've described has nothing to do with the volatility of memory. The ballot text can be edited at will after its initial entry.

The ballot text is part of the database too, and it's on the hard drive. Then it goes on the memory card of the DRE, which is non-volatile. The ballot text, and what I call the "database record" of the candidate's name, are both part of the database.

One self-correction though: The database record of the candidate's name can be edited too! In fact both the record and the ballot text can be edited before downloading them to the voting devices, but the point is, they only have to match each other the very first time the record is entered in GEMS. After that, they can appear as anything.

The poll tape should display the database record; the ballot screen should display the ballot text. The summary screen is anyone's guess, but I'd imagine it should match the ballot text and so should the VVPAT.

So it would be nice to know how Whitey's name was spelled on the poll tapes, wouldn't it?

Certainly, this system is HIGHLY exploitable, but none of this should be news to you after 7 years, should it?