Reply #153: Ah, yes, Anthony Cordesman--also the "expert" on WMDs

[Ms. Clio]

Iraq and the Risk Posed
by Weapons of
Mass Destruction

Iraq has lied to the UN and the world every time this helped it to preserve its CBRN and
missile weapons and facilities, and has been willing to suffer repeated diplomatic
embarrassments in the process. The biggest of these lies was its denial of a massive biological
weapons program between 1991-1995, but it has lied about its missile, chemical weapons, and
nuclear weapons programs as well. It has been repeatedly caught important or attempting to
import dual-use items and CIA and Department of Defense reporting makes it clear that it
continues to do to this date.


The Certainty of a Continuing Threat
Given this background, several things become clear:

· Iraq is ruled by a regime of proven liars that will lie again whenever this is
convenient.

· Iraq will never cease proliferating as long as the present regime is in power.

· Iraq does not perceive any moral or military “redlines” that will prevent it from using
CBRN weapons if it feels this is expedient.

· Iraq will continue to try to develop long-range missiles but has long had other
delivery options and will almost certainly continue to improve them.

· Iraqi proliferation will not be tied to one type of weapon of mass destruction. It will
seek chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.
These points in some ways make Iraq’s current missile and CBRN capabilities moot. The
issue is not whether Iraq has yet achieved nuclear weapons or extremely lethal biological
weapons, or even whether it will indulge in another round of UN inspections. It is that this regime
will eventually acquire nuclear weapons and biological weapons with equal or greater lethality if
it is given the time and opportunity to do so.

(snip)

The second uncertainty is whether any new round of UN inspections can really be
successful in stopping Iraqi proliferation. The answer is probably no. They might well be able to
stop Iraq from major development of missiles and their deployment, large-scale production of
chemical weapons, and producing fissile material in any significant amounts. They cannot affect
Iraq’s technology base, they cannot hope to detect a covert biological program with nuclear
lethalities, and they cannot hope to prevent Iraq from assembling a nuclear device if it can obtain
fissile or “dirty” fissile material from outside Iraq. In fact, efforts directed at large, observable
Iraqi CBRN and missile activities may simply push Iraqi into concentrating on biological
weapons and asymmetric means of delivery.
Third, it is uncertain that the US can now do a more effective job of targeting Iraqi
missile and CBRN facilities and weapons than it did during the Gulf War and Desert Fox, in spite
of the impressive advances in US targeting and strike capabilities demonstrated in Kosovo and
Afghanistan. Iraq is expert at camouflage, deception and the use of decoys, exploits dispersal and
movement (shell games), creating duplicate and back-up systems, and creating small covert
facilities. Preserving such residual capabilities would be particularly important in the case of
biological and nuclear weapons.
Finally, the US cannot count on Iraq ceasing to proliferate simply because of regime
change – even if the new regime initially appears to do so. Iraq is a highly nationalistic country
that exists in a region where Iran, Israel, Pakistan, India, Syria, and Egypt are also proliferators.
As is the case with a number of Asian powers like South Korea and Taiwan, Iraq may at a
minimum preserve a sudden breakout capability in an area like biological weapons almost
regardless of regime.




Yes. He is certainly the expert about Iraq, isn't he?

If you actually read the article, please note that he says NOTHING, EVER, about the U.S. role in helping Saddam back in the day. Yet another reason to find his opinions just a wee bit--convenient.


http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:hBiHE6pxsWQJ:www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/2002/Cordesman.pdf+%22Anthony+H.+Cordesman%22&hl=en