Reply #382: I just hammered some more on media/ BOE: NC

[chomskysright]

I just will not abide this. they may come and shoot me but I cannot take this.

To: [email protected]
Subject: Why was a Diebold employee allowed to operate Gaston voting equipment?
Cc: [email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected], [email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected],[email protected]

Marsha V. Hammond, PhD

It seems I just cannot shut-up, Mr. Bartlett. I am sorry to be such a plague but these voting problems have been building for years and now is the year to address the matter with great vigor.

The voting irregularities across NC are completely unacceptable. Please see: there are over 400 instances of voting irregularities in NC to date:
https://voteprotect.org/index.php?display=EIRMapState&cat=ALL&tab=FP0&state=North+Carolina.

Moreover, it now appears that a Diebold employee was allowed to maintain the voting machines in Gaston county on a voting day(s). Is this true?

Please do include all of this information along with what I have already submitted for my ';Election Protest' on November 29th. I am waiting for the letter in the mail from Buncombe county.

Can you possibly be allowing a DRE employee----with the history that Diebold has re: vote manipulation in GA; the lawsuit in CA just a week ago (2.6 million) ---to work with the voting machinery in a NC county? Relatedly, here is an excerpt from the memo below:

"For now Metamor accepts the requirement to restrict the server password to authorized staff in the jurisdiction, and that it should be the responsibility of the jurisdiction to restrict knowledge of this password. So no action is necessary in this matter, at this time..."

Moreover, re: the Diebolds and all their problems, there is the below memo. The Diebold machines are very accessible. Your voting count in Gaston county is untrustworthy, therefore.

See also (re: Diebolds):

http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum= 203&topic_id=45003&mesg_id=46004&page

http://www.votersunite.org/electionproblems.asp?offset=0&catid=&showall=&sort=

http://cnn.aimtoday.cnn.com/news/story.jsp?&idq=/ff/story/0001%2F20041112%2F2333565996.htm&photoid=20041102FLJC106

http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20041112-112037-7263r.htm

http://www.mountainx.com/news/2004/0519evote.php

http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,60563-2,00.html?tw=wn_story_page_next1



It's hard to believe that even after this internal Diebold memo became public, Diebold is allowed to operate the machines on election day in 2004. Were the Gaston officials unaware of this?

Also interesting is the reply from Finberg. He says that Metamor (Ciber), who certifies the machines, restricts the server password to authorized staff in the jurisdiction. Diebold people are not in the jurisdiction (by this I assume Metamor restricted access to only government officials of a particular jurisdiction). I wonder if this is still the case.


http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0309/S00150.htm

__________

Reply from Ken Clark, principal engineer for Diebold Election Systems

RE: alteration of Audit Log in Access

To:
Subject: RE: alteration of Audit Log in Access
From: "Ken Clark"
Date: Thu, 18 Oct 2001 09:55:02 -0700
Importance: Normal
In-reply-to:

Its a tough question, and it has a lot to do with perception. Of course everyone knows perception is reality.

Right now you can open GEMS' .mdb file with MS-Access, and alter its contents. That includes the audit log. This isn't anything new. In VTS, you can open the database with progress and do the same. The same would go for anyone else's system using whatever database they are using. Hard drives are read-write entities. You can change their contents.

Now, where the perception comes in is that its right now very *easy* to change the contents. Double click the .mdb file. Even technical wizards at Metamor (or Ciber, or whatever) can figure that one out.

It is possible to put a secret password on the .mdb file to prevent Metamor from opening it with Access. I've threatened to put a password on the .mdb before when dealers/customers/support have done stupid things with the GEMS database structure using Access. Being able to end-run the database has admittedly got people out of a bind though. Jane (I think it was Jane) did some fancy footwork on the .mdb file in Gaston recently. I know our dealers do it. King County is famous for it. That's why we've never put a password on the file before.

Note however that even if we put a password on the file, it doesn't really prove much. Someone has to know the password, else how would GEMS open it. So this technically brings us back to square one: the audit log is modifiable by that person at least (read, me). Back to perception though, if you don't bring this up you might skate through Metamor.

There might be some clever crypto techniques to make it even harder to change the log (for me, they guy with the password that is). We're talking big changes here though, and at the moment largely theoretical ones. I'd doubt that any of our competitors are that clever.

By the way, all of this is why Texas gets its sh*t in a knot over the log printer. Log printers are not read-write, so you don't have the problem. Of course if I were Texas I would be more worried about modifications to our electronic ballots than to our electron logs, but that is another story I guess.

Bottom line on Metamor is to find out what it is going to take to make them happy. You can try the old standard of the NT password gains access to the operating system, and that after that point all bets are off. You have to trust the person with the NT password at least. This is all about Florida, and we have had VTS certified in Florida under the status quo for nearly ten years.

I sense a loosing battle here though. The changes to put a password on the .mdb file are not trivial and probably not even backward compatible, but we'll do it if that is what it is going to take.

Ken

__________

Reply by Nel Finberg

from: *****NC Transfer Error Misses 12,000 Votes
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.ph...

Fiasco in North Carolina
(text of an AP article, no link)
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.ph...



RE: alteration of Audit Log in Access

To:
Subject: RE: alteration of Audit Log in Access
From: "Nel Finberg"
Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2001 14:48:16 -0700
Importance: Normal

Thanks for the response, Ken. For now Metamor accepts the requirement to restrict the server password to authorized staff in the jurisdiction, and that it should be the responsibility of the jurisdiction to restrict knowledge of this password. So no action is necessary in this matter, at this time. Nel