Reply #62: The "know-how" is easy to come by

[Oak2004]

A number of years ago someone ran an experiment to see if physics undergrads could design nuclear weapons that would likely work. The answer was a resounding yes (obligatory disclosure here: I'm a former physics undergrad).

The Russians beat the predicted date of nuclear success because A) US officials were then far too confident in their ability to conceal scientific fact from the rest of the world (science isn't classifiable because the natural world, and human curiosity, are not classifiable, and America's nuclear scientists were warning the government as much at the time); but, more importantly, the Soviets had a network of very effective spies within the Manhattan Project, who handed the Soviets the bomb on a silver platter.

On the other hand, good bomb-grade nuclear material is not easy to come by. And packaging the device so that it can be delivered is another substantial hurdle.

It is conceivable that Iran could very quickly cobble together something that goes kaboom using whatever fissionable material they could chemically refine (chemistry is comparatively easy; isotope separation is a bear). Such a device could be exploded in the desert and used to scare the world, by or even before 2009 (I'd think an all-out, damn the IAEC, effort by Iran could build a crude bomb in a matter of months, something true for many countries with operating nuclear reactors). A device so made would not be particularly sophisticated (not that it would need to be, given the power of even a "small", inefficient atomic bomb), nor would it necessarily be deliverable. I suspect the North Korean nuke is/was a crude nuke of this sort.

Such a nuclear program would be immediately detected for exactly what it is by the international community. There are many, many controls in place under the NPT to detect crude programs of exactly this sort. No international monitoring group is saying that they are detecting such a program.

But even if one conceded that such a nuke is being made and that it would be, somehow, immediately mass produced and weaponized, there is no reason to think that Iran would then lob their new toy at anyone else in the world. Iran and its leaders know that some combination of the US, Russia, or China (depending upon where they lobbed their bomb) would promptly turn Iran into a smoldering, cockroach-occupied, heap. No purported Koran passages promise 99 virgins for stupidly inciting and losing a nuclear war, thus causing the deaths of millions of faithful Muslems. If Kim Jung Il can get it that his new toy is for show only, Iran's much saner (IMO) leadership would certainly get the picture.

As to terrorists getting the bomb-- it is a very big leap to believe that a sovereign state would voluntarily hand a bomb to terrorists. Why? If one were used it would quickly be traced back to its nation of origin (cue "smoldering, cockroach-infested, heap"). But more importantly, nation-states need to maintain, if not an utter monopoly on force, at least overwhelming superiority of force vis-a-vis their citizenry and any client states and organizations they may manage. Handing a nuclear weapon to a non-state group gives up that superiority in a very dangerous manner.

There's a difference in temperament between people in government, even authoritarian/totalitarian government, and members of extremist groups. Government leaders of all stripes have to govern, i.e. solve practical problems and make functional compromises, and leaders had to have successfully navigated cutthroat internal politics to get to the top (i.e. leaders are not naive, but cunning). Extremists don't need to bother with practical governance, and can rise in influence by becoming ever more extreme. Every government with client extremist groups understands perfectly well that the people they exploit to further their own agenda today are likely as not going to wake up tomorrow and decide that their sponsors are the real enemy for not being pure enough.

A fine example of how nation states don't hand out bombs is Pakistan and Al Qaeda. Virtually all of the people who have access to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal have close ties to Al Qaeda, yet it does not appear that Pakistan has turned a bomb over to the group. Al Qaeda may yet get their hands on a Pakistani bomb, but it likely will never be because the government of Pakistan knowingly and willfully gives it to them.

But all of the above might obscure the real truth here: No international body has said that Iran is trying to build a crude bomb. Everyone, the US included, says they are engaged in isotope separation, a component part of a sophisticated nuclear weapons program, but also something that can generate reactor fuel. It is known to everyone, international agencies included, that Iran has had a breakthrough with their centrifuge program. Yet no international agency, knowing this, has stated that an Iranian bomb is now imminent. Until a recognized international authority with on-the-ground information says Iran is about to build a bomb, I'm not believing it.

Russia has its own motives here: Iran hasn't paid them for some nuclear-related work Russia did for them. Russia has seemingly gotten on Bush's "nonproliferation" bandwagon (though Bush spells "nonproliferation" A-M-E-R-I-C-A-N H-E-G-E-M-O-N-Y) ever since Iran skipped out on it's payment. Watch: if and when Iran pays its bills, this same Russian expert will be telling us all that Iran isn't even trying to build a weapon and needs to be left alone to pursue it's dreams of environmentally sound energy or something.

What would the US really know about the matter of Iran's nuclear ambitions that international nonproliferation agencies don't know, anyway? We don't have good intelligence from there anymore: Cheney took down Brewster-Jennings.