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The
One That Got Away
December
20, 2001
by Michael Shannon
Although there are a thousand and one reasons to question
the competency of George W Bush in his role as the chief executive
of the United States even his most vocal critics have tended
to give him a pass on how he has conducted/headed the prosecution
of the war on terrorism. With the events of the past several
days it is highly doubtful if his aura of infallibility will
last much longer. And if it does erode, as it is very likely
to, he has no one to blame but himself.
For whether Mr Bush wants to admit it or not the perception
that we have failed to this point is going to be very difficult
to counter. With the near cessation of combat that has now
taken hold in Afghanistan there is the growing realization
that the target of the administration's effort has escaped
our grasp. The question will soon shift from, "Where is bin
Laden" to the much more politically damaging one of "How did
he manage to slip through our fingers"?
That this human cockroach has vanished does not come as that
much of a surprise. This is a man who has had months if not
years to prepare routes of departure in the event they became
necessary. What is going to be troubling is the allegations
that the tactics of our combat operations were flawed in their
design. The most questionable aspect of our strategic decision
making was our near total reliance on high tech weaponry and
non-American ground forces. Particularly when we appeared
to have "tightened the noose" around bin Laden and had him
"cornered." Nancy Gibbs, in this week's Time magazine,
writes that "Navy Seals and Green Berets were massed on the
ground" in the mountains of the Torra Bora region ready to
spring the trap. Unfortunately, the rat was nowhere to be
found.
While the bravery or the skill of these men - as with all
the other members of the American armed forces that have put
themselves in harms way - is beyond reproach, less than one
hundred of them does not a mass make. Why would we use such
a small number of troops to tackle a job of such staggering
complexity and importance? Who decided that such a force was
sufficient to the mission?
While the answer to that question might get kicked down the
ladder to the field commander level, there is no ducking the
fact that the commander in chief has the final say in overall
strategy. Nor is there any denying that the man at the top
was the one who is the most responsible for establishing the
public's perception of who and what our quarry was in the
first place.
As to be expected, the backpedaling and spinning is already
beginning in earnest. And not just from the White House. Brian
Williams - a man whose stature amongst the talking heads has
grown exponentially over the past several months - was heard
to say on the top of his broadcast of December 17th that the
media is to blame for personalizing the struggle by making
Bin Laden the focal point. While this may be true to a point
- the media has made his the face of the evil we now combat
- it is undeniable that the man at the root of it all was
none other than President Bush himself. No spinning, no matter
how ferocious, can change the fact that it was the President
who looked directly into the camera - while sitting at the
conference table with his entire cabinet present - and announced
that he wanted this man "Dead or Alive". A declaration that
may have been a godsend to headline writers worldwide but
one in which the President not only put his rhetorical foot
in his mouth - word has it that both his father and wife told
him exactly that - but one that personalized the conflict
to a dangerous degree. Albeit with some rationale.
If Usama bin Laden is who we have been led to believe he
is - the mastermind and financier of a vast criminal conspiracy
whose direct aim is the lessening of American influence in
the Mideast by inflicting such a level of death and destruction
upon its people and property as to force our government to
rethink the wisdom of its involvement in that region - than
it is imperative that we neutralize his ability to inflict
such damage. Or to put it less delicately; if we wish to kill
the snake that has bitten us so viciously once and promises
to do so again and again we must remove its head. Not that
this removal will cause the idealogy which motivates its actions
- Islamic fundamentalism does not reside in any one man or
even any one group of men - to dissolve, it will not, what
it will do however is remove the clear and present danger
posed by this specific group.
And while it is true that the efforts of the United States
military have done great harm to the existing infrastructure
of the Al Qaida network it would be folly to believe that
it no longer is able to function. By our own admission/description
this is an organization that works with a minimal amount of
formal structure and visible support. Through a highly decentralized
and widely diffused network of operatives it retains much
of its lethal reach regardless of the loss of its home base.
Using the analogy of another bane of humanity: the death
of Adolf Hitler did not mark the demise of totalitarianism
or fascism but it did drive a stake into the heart of Nazism.
Having bin Laden on the loose means the threat he poses is
still very much alive and well. It is a reality that not only
gives you and I pause but one which should give Mr Bush a
sleepless night or two in the days ahead.
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