X-Post: "Gun Rights for Terrorists"

[benEzra]

9. Like these terrorists?

ACLU: U.S. Government "No Fly List" Is Unconstitutional and Ineffective

ACLU: Watchlists are bloated and overinclusive

San Francisco Chronicle: No-Fly Blacklist Snares Political Activists

Marshals: Innocent People Placed On 'Watch List' To Meet Quota

Schneier: Infants on the Terrorist Watch List

Funny how the Bush/Cheney Administration's war on civil liberties, as conceived and aggressively advocated by the Bush/Cheney Justice Department, suddenly becomes wonderful and "progressive" when somebody waves the "ZOMG gunz" flag.

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33011.pdf

CRS Report for Congress
Order Code RL33011

Terrorist Screening and Brady Background Checks for Firearms
July 25, 2005

William J. Krouse
Specialist in Domestic Security
Domestic Social Policy Division

Summary
Historically, terrorist watch list checks were not part of the firearms background check process implemented pursuant to the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act. Such watch lists were not checked, because being a known or suspected terrorist is not a disqualifying factor for firearm transfer/possession eligibility under current federal or state law. Nevertheless, if a person is a known or suspected terrorist, it suggests that there may be an underlying factor (e.g., illegal immigration or fugitive status) that could bar him from legal firearms possession. For a time, moreover, all Brady background check records for approved firearm transfers were destroyed almost immediately, precluding the opportunity to used the background check system to screen for known and suspected terrorists.

Consequently, three issues emerged regarding Brady background checks following the 9/11 attacks. First, should approved firearm transfer records be maintained on a temporary basis to determine whether persons of interest in counterterrorism investigations had previously obtained firearms improperly? Second, should terrorist watch list checks be incorporated statutorily into the Brady background check process? Third, should persons watch-listed as known or suspected terrorists be prohibited statutorily from possessing firearms?

In February 2004, the FBI reportedly modified its National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) operating procedures to retain NICS records temporarily for approved transfers that result in terrorist watch list hits, and to pass that information on to FBI investigators on the Joint Terrorism Task Forces. In addition, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales has directed the DOJ Office of Legal Policy to form a working group to review federal gun laws---particularly in regard to Brady background checks---to determine whether additional authority should be sought to prevent firearms transfers to known and suspected terrorists.

In the 109th Congress, several related pieces of legislation have been introduced that are related to NICS procedures and terrorist watch lists. The Terrorist Apprehension and Record Retention Act of 2005 (S. 578/H.R. 1225), introduced by Senator Frank Lautenberg and Representative John Conyers, would authorize the retention of all related records for at least 10 years, among other things. In addition, Representative Peter King introduced H.R. 1168, a bill that would require the Attorney General to promulgate regulations to preserve records of terrorist- and gangrelated record hits during such background checks until they were provided to the FBI. Representative Carolyn McCarthy introduced H.R. 1195, a bill that would make it unlawful for anyone to transfer a firearm to a person who was on the “No Fly” lists maintained by the Transportation Security Administration.

...

Prior to HSPD-6, DOJ initiated, in February 2002, a NICS transaction audit to determine whether prohibited aliens (noncitizens) were being improperly transferred firearms.21 As part of this audit, NICS procedures were changed, so that NICS examiners were informed of VGTOF hits. Effective February 2004, the FBI reportedly changed its NICS operating procedures to inform NICS examiners of VGTOF hits for known and suspected terrorists.22 In non-Point of Contact (non- POC) states, NICS staff validate terrorism-related VGTOF hits by contacting TSC staff. The latter have greater access to identifiers in terrorist files, with which known and suspected terrorists can be more positively identified. In full and partial POC states, the law enforcement officials who conduct firearms-related background checks under the Brady Act contact TSC staff directly. In the case of valid hits, NICS staff delay the transactions for up to three business days and contact the FBI Counterterrorism Division to allow field agents to check for prohibiting factors.