FleetwoodMac

FleetwoodMac's Journal

February 19, 2013

Iraq DID have a stockpile of biological and chemical weapons at one point...

... courtesy of The Gipper.

Reagan, who initially authorized weapon sales to both the Iraqis and Iranians during Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), decided to side with Saddam Hussein after a couple of years. In 1982, Iraq was removed from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, and Donald Rumsfeld traveled to Baghdad not long after - the first of his many trips there - for reasons that remain unclear to this day.

Acting under the instruction of the Reagan administration*, the DoD and DoC approved the delivery of 70 shipments of biological/chemical agents to Iraq between 1985-1989, under 771 separate export licenses covering at least fourteen types of chemical and biological agents, including the deadly nerve agents sarin, anthrax, and somain.

* "In June, 1982, President Reagan decided that the United States could not afford to allow Iraq to lose the war to Iran. President Reagan decided that the United States would do whatever was necessary and legal to prevent Iraq from losing the war with Iran. President Reagan formalized this policy by issuing a National Security Decision Directive ("NSDD&quot to this effect in June, 1982. I have personal knowledge of this NSDD because I co-authored the NSDD with another NSC Staff Member, Geoff Kemp. The NSDD, including even its indentifying number, is classified." - Howard Teicher

Saddam's use of these biological and chemical weapons, delivered chiefly via missiles, was well documented. Iranian soldiers became his first victims, before Saddam turned his attention to the Kurd separatists and Shia' rebels in Iraq. The United States subsequently vetoed (1986-89) all UN Security Council resolutions which condemned Saddam's use of these weapons.

This decision would come to haunt the country several years later when an estimated 100,000 American soldiers were exposed to these weapons, by varying degrees, during the Gulf War.

In 1991, UNSCOM director Rolf Ekeus, tasked with dismantling and eliminating Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear stockpile, told the U.N Security Council of the discovery of chemical warheads armed with nerve gas. Meanwhile, CIA Director William Webster estimated that Iraq possess 1,000 tons of poisonous chemical agents, fully capable of being loaded unto missiles.

By 1993, a succession of UN teams destroyed at least "13,000 155-mm artillery shells loaded with mustard gas; 6,200 rockets loaded with nerve agent; 800 nerve agent aerial bombs; 28 SCUD warheads loaded with Sarin; 75 tons of the nerve agent Sarin; 60-70 tons of the nerve agent Tabun; and, 250 tons of mustard gas and stocks of thiodiglycol, a precursor chemical for mustard gas," along with several plants used to manufacture these agents.

By 1994, for all intents and purposes, the Iraqi WMD program was effectively over, along with its legacy biological and chemical weapon programs. Within several years, the country's entire infrastructure was tethering on the brink of collapse; the economy was in shambles, the military in tatters, the population living in fear from regular coalition bombings (and Saddam's own reign of terror). Iraq was broken.

And then, PNAC and the neocons came along...

Sources:
The Teicher Affidavit
Research Advisory Committee on Gulf War Veterans’ Illnesses
The Riegle Report
How Iraq built its weapons programs
Arming Iraq: A Chronology of U.S. Involvement
Iran Contra Affair
Arafat Eases Stand on Kuwait-Palestine Link

Trivia: In 1992, after the U.N. Security Council authorized the use of force to oust Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, a surprised Saddam offered to withdraw. There are reports that he was initially operating under the assumption that the U.S. would look away at a Kuwaiti invasion. As a face saving gesture, Saddam offered to withdraw from Kuwait subject to the UN Security Council agreeing "to address the plight of Palestinians as a condition for settling the Persian Gulf crisis." His offer was rejected, and there rest, as they say, is history.

Edit: The links are not appearing.

http://www.realhistoryarchives.com/collections/hidden/teicher.htm
http://www.va.gov/RAC-GWVI/docs/Committee_Documents/ReportandRecommendations_ScientificProgressinUnderstandingGWVI_2004.pdf
http://www.gulfweb.org/bigdoc/report/riegle1.html
http://www.sptimes.com/2003/03/16/news_pf/Perspective/How_Iraq_built_its_we.shtml
http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/arming_iraq.php
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB210/
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/03/world/confrontation-in-the-gulf-arafat-eases-stand-on-kuwait-palestine-link.html

February 12, 2013

Barack Obama's Lincoln Moment

Even if you find the subject of war distasteful, as I do, this article is still a pretty illuminating read.

Abraham Lincoln served as commander in chief in the world's first truly modern war. Three key technologies were maturing simultaneously at the outset of the American Civil War in 1861: the breech-loading rifle, quick-firing and accurate at great range; the railroad, able to move massive numbers of troops and supplies swiftly over very long distances; and the telegraph, with which to manage the maneuvering of field armies. Weapons, transport, and information systems -- all were in very active play.

Barack Obama serves as commander in chief in the middle of what I would call the first truly "post-modern" war: a great struggle with nations on one side and terrorist and insurgent networks on the other. It is post-modern in terms of the ways in which al Qaeda and its affiliates have flouted accepted notions of warmaking and found new ways to engage great powers and sustain the fight against them for over a decade. They have done so largely by mastering the network form of organization and exploiting the potential of this era's Internet-driven information revolution. It is something far, far beyond just guerrilla warfare.

After sacking six commanders of his main armies in the Eastern theater of operations, Abraham Lincoln finally found a general willing to undertake a cordon offensive: Ulysses S. Grant. Lincoln soon put him in charge of all Union forces, and Grant worked hand-in-hand with his great collaborator William Tecumseh Sherman to bring about victory. To be sure, there were other very fine Union commanders by the end of the war -- a long, hard conflict can have a tremendous winnowing effect -- but Grant and Sherman were the principal players.

Barack Obama has followed a somewhat similar path, bringing to the fore senior commanders who have more than proved their understanding of the strategic demands of war in this post-modern era. Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, in one of his first pronouncements as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, spoke of the importance of crafting a more highly networked military. Gen. Raymond Odierno, the Army chief of staff, presided over much of the turnaround in Iraq, when the shift to an outpost strategy and the rise of the Awakening Movement turned the tide of battle there. Just a week ago in this magazine, he wrote of a future American force that would be comprised of small, wide-ranging units girding the globe but still able to scale up into a larger concentrated force if necessary. And Adm. William McRaven, head of Special Operations Command, has demonstrated again and again that small numbers can regularly prevail when used in networked fashion to exploit the key information- and mobility-driven advantages that add up to his concept of "relative superiority." And these three are hardly alone. Many others have cracked the code of post-modern conflict as well.

February 11, 2013

Did President Obama Single Handedly Prevented A Third American Conflict In The Middle East?

Earlier this month, we discovered that former SecState Clinton and CIA Director Gen. Petraues were advocating a military approach in Syria that is reminiscent of the one employed by Reagan in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

The idea was to vet the rebel groups and train fighters, who would be supplied with weapons.

Last week, during the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing (Oversight: Attack on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya), we found out that both SecDefense Panetta and CJCS Gen. Dempsey were also supportive of the idea of the United States supplying weapons to the rebels in Syria.

John McCain: I would ask again both of you, um, what I asked you last March when 7,500 Lib, um, citizens of Syria had been killed. It’s now up to 60,000.

How many more have to die, before you recommend military action? And did you support the recommendation by Secretary of State, uh, then Secretary of State Clinton, and then head of CIA, Gen. Petraeus, that we provide weapons to the resistance in Syria? Do you support that?

Leon Panetta: I do.

John McCain: You did support that?

Leon Panetta: We do.

John McCain: You did support that?

Leon Panetta: We did.

We know today that neither the U.S. military nor the CIA armed or trained any of the factions in Syria. This is in spite of

? Enormous pressure from GOP legislators throughout the second half of 2012 to intervene in Syria
? Cheap shots made by Romney and Ryan in the run up of the presidential election
? Strong support for such an action from four of President Obama's cabinet members (SecState Clinton, SecDefense Panetta, Gen. Petraues and Gen. Dempsey)

We could've had an Afghanistan redux here, a Reagan Doctrine 2.0 if you will. We could've been staring at, by now, demands for American forces to land in Damascus, along with numerous blowback scenarios.

Instead, all we have now is that of ol' man McCain doing his circus antics. All thanks to that one fella who stuck to his guns, and in the process, potentially saving thousands of American lives.

February 7, 2013

Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader

I think a significant number of people are basing their opinions entirely on news reports in all its hyperbolic glory.
Perhaps a look at the actual DoJ White Paper is in order?

Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa'ida or An Associated Force
Source

Excerpts

This white paper sets forth a legal framework for considering the circumstances in which the U.S. government could use lethal force in a foreign country outside the area of active hostilities against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al-Qa'ida or an associated force[1] of al-Qa'ida—that is, an al-Qa'ida leader actively engaged in planning operations to kill Americans.

Here the Department of Justice concludes only that where the following three conditions are met, a U.S. operation using lethal force in a foreign country against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al-Qa'ida or an associated force would be lawful: (1) an informed; high level official of the U.S. government has determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States; (2) capture is infeasible, and the United States continues to monitor whether capture becomes feasible; and (3) the operation would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles. This conclusion is reached with recognition of the extraordinary seriousness of a lethal operation by the United States against a U.S. citizen, and also of the extraordinary seriousness of the threat posed by senior operational al-Qa'ida members and the loss of life that would result were their operations successful.

The President has authority to respond to the imminent threat posed by al-Qa'ida and its associated forces, arising from his constitutional responsibility to protect the country, the inherent right of the United States to national self defense under international law, Congress's authorization of the use of all necessary and appropriate military force against this enemy, and the existence of an armed conflict with al-Qa'ida under international law. Based on these authorities, the President may use force against al-Qa'ida and its associated forces. As detailed in this white paper, in defined circumstances, a targeted killing of a U.S. citizen who has joined al-Qa'ida or its associated forces would be lawful under U.S. and international law. Targeting a member of an enemy force who poses an imminent threat of violent attack to the United States is not unlawful. It is a lawful act of national self defense. Nor would it violate otherwise applicable federal laws barring unlawful killings in Title 18 or the assassination ban in Executive Order No 12333.

Were the target of a lethal operation a U.S. citizen who may have rights under the Due Process Clause and the Fourth Amendment, that individual's citizenship would not immunize him from a lethal operation. Under the traditional due process balancing analysis of Mathews v. Eldridge, we recognize that there is no private interest more weighty than a person's interest in his life. But that interest must be balanced against the United States' interest in forestalling the threat of violence and death to other Americans that arises from an individual who is a senior operational leader of al-Q'aida or an associated force of al-Q'aida and who is,engaged in plotting against the United States.

The paper begins with a brief summary of the authority for the use of force in the situation described here, including the authority to target a U.S. citizen having the characteristics described above with lethal force outside the area of active hostilities. It continues with the constitutional questions, considering first whether a lethal operation against such a U.S. citizen would be consistent with the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, U.S. Const, amend. V. As part of the due process analysis, the paper explains the concepts of "imminence," feasibility of capture, and compliance with applicable law of war principles. The paper then discusses whether such an operation would be consistent with the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable seizures, U.S. Const, amend. IV; It concludes that where certain conditions are met, a lethal operation against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al-Qa'ida or its associated forces—a terrorist organization engaged in constant plotting against the United States, as well as an enemy force with which the United States is in a congressionally authorized armed conflict—and who himself poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States, would not violate the Constitution. The paper also includes an analysis concluding that such an operation would not violate certain criminal provisions prohibiting the killing of U.S. nationals outside the United States; nor would it constitute either the commission of a war crime or an assassination prohibited by Executive Order 12333.

February 6, 2013

Of Shay, Nat Turner and the Green Corn Rebellions...

This list is obviously nowhere near comprehensive, and is merely compiled to illustrate a point.

? Shay’s Rebellion (1786-1787)
Number of American Rebels Killed Without ‘Due Process’: 5

? German Coast Uprising (1811)
Number of American Rebels('Slaves') Killed Without ‘Due Process’: 95

? Nat Turner's Rebellion (1831)
Number of American Rebels Killed Without ‘Due Process’: 56

? The raid on Harpers Ferry (1858)
Number of American Rebels Killed Without ‘Due Process’: 2

? American Civil War (1861-1865)
Number of Armed American Rebels Killed Without ‘Due Process’: Approximately 300,000

? Green Corn Rebellion (1917)
Number of American Rebels Killed Without ‘Due Process’: 3

? Jayuya Uprising (1950)
Number of American Rebels Killed Without ‘Due Process’: 2

? Utuado Uprising (1950)
Number of American Rebels Killed Without ‘Due Process’: 9

? Kent State Shooting (1970)
Number of American Student Protesters Killed Without ‘Due Process’: 4

? Jackson State Killings (1970)
Number of American Student Protesters Killed Without ‘Due Process’: 2

? Wounded Knee incident (1973)
Number of American Rebels Killed Without ‘Due Process’: 2

? Drone Attacks on American Citizens (2011)
Number of American Rebels (unlawful combatants*) With Dual Citizenship and Openly Engaging In Terrorist Activities Against The United States Killed Without ‘Due Process^’: 2 (Anwar Al-Awlaki and Samir Khan)

Collateral Damage: 1 (16-year Abdul Rahman al-Awlaki, the son of al-Awlaki Sr.)

*11. Citizens of the United States who associate themselves with the military arm of an enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war. P. 37.

^Admiral (Rtd.) Dennis Blair's (Director of National Intelligence): The reason I went this far in open session is, I just don’t want other Americans who are watching to think that we are careless about endangering—in fact, we are not careless about endangering lives at all, but we especially are not careless about endangering American lives as we carry out the policies to protect most of the country, and I think we ought to go into details in closed session.

Murder is an abhorrent act, and while I doubt I could ever take the life of another person, I understand that the world we live in is not all unicorns and rainbows, and in the words of Kant, morality is not properly the doctrine of how we may make ourselves happy, but how we may make ourselves worthy of happiness. A measure of justice, as well as the proportionality of our actions, is an inherent facet of jus ad bellum. And in my humble estimations, Mr. Obama acted as he saw fit, within the bounds of the Constitution.

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